

THE BIBLE AND THE TRINITY¹

Robert W. Jenson

THESIS

The usual supposition is that the doctrine of Trinity, and the Chalcedonian Christology which follows from it, are not in the Bible, and certainly not in that bulk of the Bible we call the Old Testament. Those who suppose that these doctrines are false, are pleased not to find them in Scripture — however much or little the Bible may otherwise influence their decisions. Those who suppose that they are nevertheless true, are liable to say that they are a legitimate development from things that *are* in the Bible, over against new questions — or something on those lines. I have myself argued in such fashion, and do not think it wrong. But I think it is too little. The doctrine of Trinity and Chalcedonian — in fact Neo-Chalcedonian — Christology are, *in the appropriate fashion*, indeed in the Bible, and most especially in the Old Testament.

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Now of course the key formulas of Nicene-Constantinopolitan dogma, that the Son is *homoousios* with the Father, or that there are “one nature, and three persons” in God, do indeed not appear in Scripture, and there is indeed a development — whether Spirit-guided or unfortunate — that leads to them. But as David Yeago some time ago pointed out very forcefully;² judgments — and, e.g., “There are one nature and three persons in

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1. This essay derives from a lecture given at the Divinity School of Duke University.

2. David Yeago, “The New Testament and Nicene Dogma,” *PRO ECCLESIA* 3 (1994), pp. 152-64.

The church reads the Bible as narrative. So if the doctrine of Trinity, or high Christology, are indeed "in" the Bible, it may be they are in large part there as features of the narration, indeed, of the narrating. Indeed, if they did appear as doctrinal propositions, one might suspect something was amiss with the text.

God" is a judgment — can usually be made by a great variety of linguistic means, so that the fact that Scripture does not contain this particular sentence does not at all mean that Scripture does not contain the same judgment about God.

Moreover, there are a considerable variety of things one might mean by saying that something is or is not to be found "in" a particular document. Does the Constitution contain a right of privacy? It depends on what kind of containing you are looking for. Strict constructionists say it does not; the court majority has said it does.³ Fundamentalists and modernists alike often look for things "in" the Bible and do not find them there because they are looking for the wrong sort of phenomena.

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For this essay I have in mind nothing so grand as a complete demonstration that the Bible teaches the Trinity. But I do want to consider some familiar passages, and try to persuade at least some readers that the way they are narrated indeed displays the Trinity and the Christ of high doctrine.

GENESIS 22

The Sacrifice of Isaac, the *Akedah*, was throughout the pre-modern history of the church taken as a type of Christ's sacrificial death, and moreover of a location of that death within God's triune life with us. Isaac is the Son who is given over by his Father, by a Father who is either Abraham or the God who tests Abraham or both at once — and so is either Israel who delivers Jesus over or the God of Israel whom he called Father, who delivers him over, or both at once. Modern exegesis has of course scorned trinitarian reading of the *Akedah*, saying that it "reads into" the text meanings which the writer or writers cannot have intended. But in fact the plain face of the text in its narrower context demands one trinitarian reading, and in its fuller Old Testament context is patient of another, the traditional one.

We may start with an obvious question: Who is this "Angel of the Lord?"

We may start with an obvious question: Who is this "Angel of the Lord?" The *persona* who appears and speaks to Abraham is at his appearing described as *mal'ak*, messenger, of the Lord, and that structure of distinction between the Angel of the Lord and the Lord whose messenger he is constitutes his identity in this passage, as it does in every other passage where

3. Which, by the way, I very much doubt.

he appears. Accordingly, in his address to Abraham he initially refers to God in the third person. Yet then in the very same sentence and without missing a beat, he refers in the first person to himself as God.⁴

And so, notoriously, it goes every time this figure appears. To Hagar the Angel of the Lord appears, and then says, "I will greatly multiply your offspring." (Gen. 16:10) To Jacob, the Angel is as explicit as possible: "I am the God of Bethel...." (Gen. 31:11-13). Next to the *Akedah*, the most spectacular case is doubtless the story of Moses at the burning bush (Ex. 3:2-6): it was the Angel of the Lord who "appeared" to Moses as the flame of fire in the bush; but then it was "God" who called to him out of the bush, and as it turns out called to him in order among other things to identify which God he is and to provide Moses with his personal name.

Now — is this *persona*, the Angel of the Lord, simply the same one as the Lord or an identity different from the Lord in the Lord's own identity? The answer of course has to be that he is both. He certainly *is* the Lord: he is the Lord as the Lord is this dialogical *participant in* the story of nascent Israel. But he is also *related to* the Lord as the Lord is the one who sends him, and who is the author of that story of nascent Israel in which the Angel of the Lord appears. We may note that the "Angel of the Lord" title invariably serves to *introduce* the *persona*; it is as the Lord is introduced into what might until then have been taken as a story about created *personae* only, that he is identified as his own Angel. Once the Lord's role *in* the story is established, the oneness of the Lord's Angel with the Lord himself can rule the discourse.

Which is to say, the dialectics of the Angel's identity over against the Lord are precisely those which the Nicene-Constantinopolitan doctrine of Trinity specifies for the Son or Logos. In Athanasius' interpretation of the Nicene decision's "*homoousion* with the Father," which had become the accepted meaning of the phrase by the time Nicea was reaffirmed at Constantinople, that the Son is "of one being with the Father" means that the Son is the *same God as* the Father and that he is this precisely by his *relation to* the Father. And that in turn is the same dialectic that Peter displays when in his Pentecost sermon he cites Psalm 110 in support of his proclamation of the risen Lord as the one who has poured out the Spirit. Peter cites the psalm precisely to avoid any appearance of "two lords in the heavens," a horror to any right-thinking Jew. The dialectic of the citation, as Peter uses it, is that Jesus *is* the *one* Lord in that the one Lord *addresses* him as the Lord.

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4. It might be objected that prophets also speak in the first person for God. There are, however, at least two points of difference. Prophets do not present themselves "from heaven" or as flames in bushes or otherwise in the mode of epiphany. And the prophetic formula which establishes the first-person message as in some way a quotation, "Thus says the Lord," is missing from the Angel-passages except at one ambiguous point, Genesis 22:16. And then — the phenomenon of prophecy might itself be examined for its trinitarian structure!

The Old Testament phenomenon of this doubled identity of the Lord is not limited to the Pentateuch's Angel — if it were, it could perhaps be dismissed as a curiosity. The Old Testament displays throughout its narrative personae with the same structure, in which the narrative alternates between identifying some personal entity as the Lord and differentiating that same entity from the Lord.

The Old Testament phenomenon of this doubled identity of the Lord is not limited to the Pentateuch's Angel — if it were, it could perhaps be dismissed as a curiosity. The Old Testament displays throughout its narrative *personae* with the same structure, in which the narrative alternates between identifying some personal entity as the Lord and differentiating that same entity from the Lord. Is the "glory of the Lord," which comes to or inhabits the sanctuary, an identity related to the Lord or the Lord himself? To make sense of the texts, we have to say both; thus according to I Kings 8, Solomon's dedicatory address to the Lord calls the temple he has built "a place for *thee* to settle into..." and the prayer is answered by the coming of "the glory of" the one invoked. The Deuteronomist's Moses commands the people to bring sacrifice to the Lord, but what awaits to receive them when they get there is the "name of the Lord." (12:5-11). Nor will it do to explain these phenomena away as manifestations of a general religious need to combine "transcendent" and "immanent" moments in the interpretation of God, or something else along those lines. The entire schema of immanence and transcendence is inappropriate to the particular God of the Old Testament; among other things, the invariable locus of such general religious concern is the image of the god, which the Lord determinedly does not have.

Now if we read the Old Testament as one continuing narrative, it is natural to take these various phenomena as differing displays of the same fact about the narrated God. To some extent this is done also by the rabbis, in the general concept of the *Shekinah*, the "settlement" of God in Israel, who shares God's being and Israel's fate. And the intuition of interchangeability is occasional explicitly supported; so in yet another quite astonishing Pentateuchal passage, Exodus 23:20-22. God says to Israel, "I will send my Angel⁵ before you to guard you on the way and to bring you to the place I have prepared. Be attentive to him and listen to his voice ... for my *name* is in him." And then as elsewhere when the Angel of the Lord appears, there is the switch of persons: "If you listen attentively to *his* voice, and do all that *I* say..."

We return to the *Akedah* for a second dip. The traditional typology discovered the Son not in the Angel but in the figure of Isaac. And this too is a possible reading, if the text is not taken in isolation. For not only does the Old Testament display a doubling of God's identity between his identity as an actor in the history he lives with us and his identity as the author of the history, we will see in a moment that the Old Testament displays also a double identity of the Lord within his entity as actor in the salvation-history: this doubling is between individual Israelites who are in one way or another paired in the genitive with God, as most notably the king or a prophet, and Israel herself as a corporate entity. To perceive in our passage a pairing of the messenger and the

5. Not "an Angel," as in the generally too freely paraphrasing NRSV.

victim, as somehow the same even as they are two, is not at all unlikely in the broader canonical context.

And finally to yet a third trinitarian phenomenon in our passage. God commanded Abraham to sacrifice Isaac in order to “test” Abraham, which at least here means action taken to find out something about him. What God wanted to find out was whether Abraham “feared God.” This is often read as if “God” were the given, so that the question was about Abraham’s *fear*. But in context the question more plausibly goes the other way around. God tested Abraham “after these things,” that is, after the call of Abraham, the Lord’s repeated appearances to promise nationhood, the land, and the role of the nation for the nations, the birth of Isaac “as ... promised,” and incidents both of Abraham’s trust in the promises and of his hedging his bets. The story, it is announced, has arrived at a juncture, and at this juncture there is something God needs to know about Abraham before things go any further.

The question, I suggest, was not whether Abraham feared some God or other, for generic fear of gods was indeed simply a given in the world described by Genesis, but rather whether Abraham *rightly* feared God, which, as Martin Luther above all pointed out, is exactly the same thing as whether he feared the *right God*. The question was whether Abraham trusted solely in the promises, so that even when the possibility of their fulfillment is taken away, he still holds to them, *that is*, to the sheerly promissory reality of God, which is all that is left. The test was whether the God Abraham feared was the God of promises, the God for whom it is appropriate to bind himself to act in specific ways within a created story, and to vindicate his deity precisely by faithfulness to such binding, the God who genuinely is an actor both of and in his own story with his people. What God wanted to know about Abraham was whether Abraham was with him in the story to which God must now irrevocably commit himself — or not.

A recent remarkable article by James L. Mays⁶ locates the dramatic center of the passage in the Lord’s statement after Abraham passes the test, “Now I know....” And it is an astonishing center: there apparently was something the Lord did not know before posing the test, and that he has to know before he can proceed to what follows, which is to reiterate the promises in their finally binding form. Only after God knows that Abraham fears specifically him in his identity as the God of promises, are the promises sealed with a divine oath.

Did God not know beforehand how Abraham would stand the test? If bound by a too-simple doctrine of divine omniscience, we say, “Of course,” we ruin the story. If we say, “Perhaps not,” that does rather offend our usual interpretation of God. Let me put the question so:

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6. James L. Mays, “‘Now I Know’: An Exposition of Genesis 22:1-19 and Matthew 26:36-46,” *Theology Today*, 58 (2002), pp. 519-25.

God presumably knows all things, but what does this passage suggest about *how* he knows at least some of them? Clearly our passage marks some sort of before and after of knowledge and intention, also for God, and a before and after determined by an event in the temporal story the Old Testament tells about God with his people, an event in which human actors and the Lord as Angel or Glory or Name or ... are mutually implicated. It is this very structure in God and of the relation between what is true in God and his involvement with his people, for which the doctrine of Trinity seeks to give account.

ISAIAH 49

As we asked about the Angel, we have to ask about this Servant — and scholars have asked and asked through the whole history of exegesis: Who is he? At the beginning of the Song, he is explicitly identified as Israel, the nation. But once so identified, he appears not as the nation but as a particular Israelite with a prophetic mission to Israel, to bring Israel back to God.

For the next considerations, I take another familiar passage, the Song of the Servant in Isaiah 49. This is perhaps the most striking example of that second doubling invoked a moment ago.

As we asked about the Angel, we have to ask about this Servant — and scholars have asked and asked through the whole history of exegesis: Who is he? At the beginning of the Song, he is explicitly identified as Israel, the nation. But once so identified, he appears *not* as the nation but as a particular Israelite with a prophetic mission *to* Israel, to bring Israel back to God, which is of course simply the usual mission of a prophet. And then it is said that this is too easy a mission. This prophet is given a mission to the gentiles, which is in fact the mission given to the nation in the promises to Abraham, as reiterated eschatologically in later prophecy. We can eliminate these dialectics by source and redaction-critical surgery, but the presumable last redactor of the canonical text left them in, and they are too glaring for this to have been oversight. Nor do ad hoc theories of corporate personality or the like help very much.

Is the Servant Israel or an Israelite? Again the only answer that can be fitted to the texts without Procrustes' methods, is that he is both at once. He is a prophet within and to Israel who just so is Israel as prophet to the nations. Or vice versa: he is Israel, as Israel appears also *within* Israel for Israel.

But wherein is this doubling of the *ebed adonai* a doubling of the *Lord's persona* within his history with Israel? Consider: What must be the final ontological identification of one who is a human individual and is simultaneously the communal context of that very individual? In any case, the form of the *Ebed* reminds forcibly of Augustine's *totus Christus*, the Christ who is both himself as head of his body and the whole of body and head, and who just so is eschatologically the second person of Trinity.

So much at least is clear: whatever may have been in the mind or minds of the author or authors of this text — if indeed anything was exactly

"in" their minds, or even in the mind of that last redactor⁷ — followers of the risen Jesus were only conforming to the actual statement of the text when they took it as applicable to their Lord. For the text presents an historically unfulfilled template, indeed a template unfulfillable by anyone who lives only within the parameters of this age, of history as it now proceeds. To fit that template to someone is to say that this particular Israelite brings Israel back to the Lord and that just so this person is Israel thus brought back, to take up her final mission to the nations. It is to identify one in whom both occur: Israel concentrates to this one, and as this one opens to all. If Jesus is risen, he is so to be identified, and that is what the primal church did.

We turn to a New Testament text, the scene in Gethsemane. It has been a problem for theologians since there have been theologians. As with the previous passages, there is an obvious question: Could Jesus have backed out? Could he have prayed, "Let this cup pass from me..." and not finished with "...your will be done?"

MARK 14 PARR.

Finally we turn to a New Testament text, the scene in Gethsemane. It has been a problem for theologians since there have been theologians. As with the previous passages, there is an obvious question: Could Jesus have backed out? Could he have prayed, "Let this cup pass from me..." and not finished with "...your will be done?"

The story is plain enough: here is a man before a great test, which he understands to be inflicted by God; he prays to be spared, but in the end bends his will to God's. So far there is no high level problem. But then — If one presupposes the doctrine of the Incarnation, as exegetes did from the time there were exegetes until recently, the problem is that either you have God the Son at least momentarily at odds with God the Father, or you have the "human nature" of Christ somehow abandoned by his "divine nature" and left on its own over against the Father. It is this apparent problem that drove the fathers to such unworthy expedients as saying that Christ was only play-acting, to set us an example of proper prayer in adversity. A dilemma, however, appears also *without* presupposing the two-natures doctrine — indeed, the dilemma rather leads to the doctrine. It is this problem I want to point out.

If we say, "No, Jesus could not have failed his mission," this utterly spoils the Gethsemane story. But if we say, "Yes, Jesus could have failed his mission," this spoils the total story Mark tells, of which the Gethsemane story is a part. For Mark's story is shaped and driven by a relentless drive to its denouement in cross and resurrection, by what indeed can only be called a divine necessity.

It would appear that somehow we must incorporate a possibility that Jesus could have withdrawn at Gethsemane into a certainty of his not doing so. But how are we to do that?

7. The whole notion of authorial intention is perhaps anachronistic when applied to ancient authors. It is doubtful that the final redactor of the *Akedah* had anything "in mind" in the modern sense, since he would not have understood himself as a subject in the modern sense.

Between "Father, let this cup pass from me," and "Nevertheless, your will be done," there had to be, said Maximus, a true human decision. Indeed the two utterances in their sequence were the decision; and just so the decision was not only authentically human but wrought out in authentically human struggle. But how to understand this, without making the Savior into one whose allegiance to God is fragile, that is, one himself in need of salvation?

Here, for the only time in this essay, I want to report and appropriate the thinking of a classic theologian. The profoundest reflection on this question known to me is that of Maximus the Confessor, a seventh-century genius whose thought is currently a major concern of scholarship.⁸ Maximus' attention was drawn to the Gethsemane passage by the attempt of imperial theologians to mollify the monophysite dissenters to Chalcedon by proposing that while there are indeed two natures in Christ and even two "energies" — whatever these last were supposed to be — there is only one will. And indeed what sort of freak would a person with two wills be?

Maximus could not endorse this "monothelite" proposal. If there is only one will in Christ, this must be the divine will. But then "Father, let this cup pass from me," if it does not express an impossible inner divine conflict, must indeed be play-acting. And that Maximus could not believe.

Between "Father, let this cup pass from me," and "Nevertheless, your will be done," there had to be, said Maximus, a true human decision. Indeed the two utterances in their sequence *were* the decision; and just so the decision was not only authentically human but wrought out in authentically human struggle. But how to understand this, without making the Savior into one whose allegiance to God is fragile, that is, one himself in need of salvation? How maintain the Gospel-writers' sense of their story's divine necessity?

Maximus found this could only be done by invoking the doctrine of Trinity in an unprecedented way, and by radicalizing the Chalcedonian doctrine of two natures. Indeed, the texts drove him to reinvent these doctrines, and given his genius might well have driven him to develop them *de novo* had they not previously existed.

Maximus reasoned that if it is human to decide, that is, if human decision belongs to human *nature*, and Jesus' decision in Gethsemane is an act according to his human nature, then if the story of Gethsemane belongs to a larger story of divine necessity, if, that is, there is also divine decision in play, this deciding must correlatively belong to divine nature. So there are two deciding's afoot here, one for each nature, human and divine; Maximus is a "dyothelite."

But there is something odd about the notion of a divine nature: it is not individuated, which would give three gods. Instead, divine nature is what the Father and the Son in the Spirit have only *mutually*. Thus divine decision is not in itself the act of an individual divine person. Yet what would be an impersonal decision? Must not the divine decision be that of some one person, and in this case of Jesus the Son?

The solution lies close to hand, and took so long to arrive at only because it is so shocking. It is precisely the human decision made in

8. To the following, with the references, Robert W. Jenson, *Systematic Theology* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1997-1999), I:134-138.

Gethsemane that *is in God* the decision between the Father and the Son in the Spirit, that the divine story told by the Gospels shall continue.

Now I want to turn the argument around, to display the point I want more particularly to make here. To make sense of the Gethsemane story we must say: Jesus' human decision is the decision by which we are saved, and so must be a divine decision, and one which is not that of an other single divine identity. The Gethsemane scene can finally be made sense of only by the Trinity doctrine at its most peculiar and by Christology at its most drastic.

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GENESIS 1

So far I have spoken of the Spirit only implicitly or by-the-by. It is time to remedy that — and by doing it that way, of course, I repeat the historical pattern, that western theologians are always having to remedy their neglect of the Spirit.

According to Genesis 1, "In the beginning, God created the heavens and the earth. And the earth was without form and void, and darkness covered the face of the earth." So far perhaps the translation is unproblematic.⁹ But how do we proceed? As formerly, "And the Spirit of God brooded over the face of the waters?" Or as the NRSV, "...while a wind from God swept over the face of the waters"? Is God's *Ruach* a personal spirit or an impersonal blast? In the Bible generally it is sometimes the one and sometimes the other, and that finally is what makes this passage hard to translate.¹⁰

Is God's Ruach a personal spirit or an impersonal blast? In the Bible generally it is sometimes the one and sometimes the other.

Consider the following notorious text: Saul is chasing David, and is directed to Naboth, but on the way "the Spirit of God fell upon him," with the result that "he stripped off his clothes..., and prophesied before Samuel in like manner" as a whole company of raving exhibitionists already at it, "and lay down naked all that day and all that night." (I Kings 19:22-24) A *wind from God* could do that, but would someone we might call the Spirit of God, parallel to the Angel of God? On the other side, there is Jesus' farewell promise, "But the..Holy Spirit, whom the Father will send in my name, will teach you everything, and remind you of all that I have said to you." (John 14:26) The Spirit of God could do that, but could a wind? Or even a breath, or even a breath of life, in the doubled genitive?

On the one hand, throughout much of Scripture the Spirit is a force that goes out from someone to agitate others, a force which may but need

9. Translations that make the opening sentence a dependent clause are surely anachronistic, and anyway do not effect my point here.

10. And not reconstruction of a text behind the text, which would — if it existed — have described a classical chaos-monster.

In the case of the Spirit there is no doubt that reference is to some sort of entity related to the Lord in his own identity, what is lacking is what the Eastern fathers and Orthodox theologians call the "face," the prosopon; it seems the Spirit should be an identifiable personal entity, except that sometimes it is not.

not represent the personal will of that someone. On the other hand the Spirit appears also in the Old Testament as the teacher who leads into the ways of the Lord; indeed in the last of the Old Testament's theological schemes we learn that all *Torah* is the teaching of the Spirit.

The question posed by biblical discourse about the Spirit is, so to speak, the opposite of that posed by the appearance of various figures which lead us to speak of the Son, or by New Testament passages about the Son that constrain us to Christology. In the case of the Spirit there is no doubt that reference is to some sort of entity related to the Lord in his own identity, what is lacking is what the Eastern fathers and Orthodox theologians call the "face," the *prosopon*; it seems the Spirit should be an identifiable personal entity, except that sometimes it is not — and readers may notice how unsurprised they were by that "it."

The problem has enshrined itself in the very structure of Western theology. By classical Augustinian doctrine, the Spirit is the *vinculum amoris*, the bonding love, between the Father and the Spirit. But when my wife and I speak of our love, we do not think of this as a third party; it is itself not an identity but a factor in our identities or rather in our identity with each other. Western theology of course knows that the Spirit, as given by Jesus to teach of him, must be a personal identity, but the abstract language which makes the Spirit a capacity or a power or a love often overwhelms this knowledge. And such language has this power because, after all, it too is in Scripture.

What would be a personal identity that could also and just so be a life-breath and life-giving breath, indeed the sheer force blowing *from* a personal identity? That is the question posed by the passages we have read and many more besides. Once the question is put, it almost answers itself: it would have to be something with just these characters, that is, a personal identity who so loved and enlivened and agitated certain others as to be without remainder — except for the identity of this agency — their own life and love and force. And that makes a considerable piece of the doctrine of Trinity. For those in the biblical story whose love the Spirit could be are the Father and the Son; and only as the infinity that God is could a spirit be at once an agent of others' love for one another and that love itself.

EPILOGUE

My exegetical ventures have of course not been theologically altogether neutral. I have been supposing from the start that a serious doctrine of Trinity and an appropriately accompanying Christology are true. Yet if these doctrines were external hermeneutic principles otherwise obtained and then imposed on Scripture, they themselves could not be

authoritative. It is therefore important to see that Trinity and Chalcedonian Christology in fact *show* themselves in Scripture. So for this essay, what I have tried to do is take a few texts that can be regarded as exceptionally interesting from quite different points of view, and point out where in these texts just this happens.

Or one might put it so: it is important to see that there is indeed a hermeneutical circle between Scripture and the doctrines of Nicea, Constantinople and Chalcedon. The doctrines are hermeneutical principles for the reading of Scripture, and Scripture displays the doctrines. In this essay, I have tried to round that circle.

In the texts chosen, trinitarian features appear especially as *questions* that the texts force upon us. I have deliberately avoided those New Testament texts, from the Epistles or from John, where my assignment would be all too easy; we have considered Old Testament texts, and one from the New Testament that has historically been anything but a proof text of standard Christology or trinitarianism.

So another thesis at the end. Given the story about God with his people that the Old Testament actually tells, and given the continuation and denouement of that story as the story the Gospels tell of Jesus and his crucifixion, it needed only his resurrection for the biblical discourse about God to become explicitly and inescapably trinitarian. The Gospel of John is of course the great theological display. But to my mind even more important are two other New Testament phenomena.

One is what I have in several writings called a general trinitarian logic that shapes all the New Testament's talk of God. The New Testament writers, reflecting of course the traditions behind them, are mostly incapable of referring to God without in some way touching the three bases of Father, Son and Spirit.¹¹ When I was researching this matter, I liked to search out instances in less obvious NT places. I was pleased to find Jude — who reads Jude? — 20-21: "...build yourselves up on your most holy faith; pray in the Holy Spirit; keep yourselves in the love of God; look forward to the mercy of our Lord Jesus Christ...." Or II Timothy 4:1: "In the presence of God, and of Christ Jesus... and in view of his appearing and his kingdom, I solemnly urge you...." The other is the triune name of God, commanded for the church's liturgy by the risen Lord's fundamental mandate of the church in Matthew 28:18-19. □

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11. For proof of this, readers may simply start reading anywhere in the Epistles; they will not need to go more than a few paragraphs.



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